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Interest in public accountability and government transparency 
is increasing worldwide. The literature on the determinants of 
transparency is evolving but is still in its early stages. So far, it 
has typically focused on national or regional governments 
while neglecting the local government level. This paper builds 
on the scarce knowledge available in order to examine the 
economic, social, and institutional determinants of local 
government transparency in Spain. We draw on a 2010 survey 
and the transparency indexes constructed by the NGO 
Transparency International (Spain) in order to move beyond 
the fiscal transparency addressed in previous work. In so 
doing, we broaden the analysis of transparency to the 
corporate, social, fiscal, contracting, and planning activities of 
governments. Our results on overall transparency indicate that 
large municipalities and left-wing local government leaders are 
associated with better transparency indexes; while the worst 
results are presented by provincial capitals, cities where tourist 
activity is particularly important and local governments that 
enjoy an absolute majority. The analysis of other transparency 
categories generally shows the consistent impact of these 
determinants and the need to consider a wider set of variables 
to capture their effect. 
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The truth is incontrovertible. Malice may attack it, 
ignorance may deride it, but in the end, there it is. 
W. Churchill
1. Introduction
The economic downturn and the responsibilities and performance of many 
public officials with respect to the management of the public administration have 
renewed demands for democratization and accountability. In this context, transparency 
becomes a necessary tool for the public to monitor and evaluate the performance of 
their representatives and public servants. Furthermore, transparency becomes an 
important component of good governance and institutional quality, which in turn, are 
proven drivers of economic growth and public welfare (Knack and Keefer 1995; 
Williamson, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002; Kaufman and Kraay, 
2002). 
There are many definitions of transparency but all of them hold the role of 
information accessibility at their core. For instance, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) define
transparency as the increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social, and political 
information, accessible to all relevant stakeholders. This definition may be applied to 
several public activities. For instance Islam (2004) focuses on the timely availability of 
economic data. However, transparency may also be focused on political markets. 
Whatever the case may be, transparency is always a necessary condition for 
accountability, since access to information constitutes the first step in accountability
processes (Meijer, 2003).
In addition, improving transparency to reduce corruption has been the focus of a 
broad literature (Blumkin and Gradstein, 2002; Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010; Peisakhin 
and Pinto, 2010; among others).1
1 One common definition of corruption is the “improper use of public office in exchange for 
private gain” (Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010).
Alesina and Perotti (1996) identify two theories, the 
fiscal-illusion and principal-agent theories, to explain why politicians are not 
encouraged to adopt the most transparent practices. Nonetheless, greater 
transparency acts to minimize the moral hazard problem by facilitating public control, 
which is linked to less corruption. As stated in the seminal paper on the economic 
theory of crime by Becker (1968), the probability that an individual commits a
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crime depends on the assumed risk, the possible gain, and the probable punishment. 
Transparency works by increasing the risk of being caught. However, transparency 
alone may not be sufficient (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010), and 
we need other accompanying mechanisms (sanctions, social embarrassment, 
education, media circulation, etc.). 
From the perspective of democracy, the transparency and dissemination of 
information is critical for different social groups to participate in the decision-making 
process (Bellver and Kaufmann, 2005). Information dissemination is a core concept of 
deliberative democracies that affects the behavior of the political system. Formal 
institutions of political competition are not sufficient to deliver a responsive government, 
particularly in the case of the most vulnerable and poorly informed citizens, unless 
voters have real authority to discipline poorly functioning incumbents thanks to effective 
institutions of information transmission (Besley and Burgess, 2002). 
Beyond the institutional view, transparency is desirable from the economic 
perspective, because it increases efficiency in the allocation of resources by reducing 
principal-agent problems (Holmström, 1979) and discouraging rent-seeking instead of 
productive activities (Baumol, 1990; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1991). In fact, 
transparency is based on the accessibility of information, which is a public good that 
improves the functioning of markets and prevents market failures, according to 
classical papers by Stigler (1961), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Stiglitz (2000), among 
others. 
Finally, by making corruption less probable or more difficult, transparency 
provides a better context for economic growth, efficiency, and development as a means 
of improving governance (Mauro, 1995; Olson, Sarna, and Swamy, 2000; Meón and 
Wells, 2005).  Alt and Lassen (2006) show the effects of fiscal transparency on the 
accumulation of public debt, and how institutional factors influence this specific type of 
transparency. Nonetheless, other recent theoretical papers, such as the work of 
Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009), cast doubt on the expected and unambiguous benefits of 
fiscal transparency by showing that it might promote incentives to wasteful spending in 
the case of full transparency of revenues. Others, like Bac (2001, p. 93), argue that 
“transparency enhances the incentives to establish connections for corruption by 
improving the information about the identities of the ‘key’ policy makers”.
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In spite of the clear social and economic relevance of transparency in public 
institutions, and the broad literature discussing and formalizing the role of information 
and corruption, there are still few empirical studies of the determinants of transparency. 
Furthermore, most of the existing studies are devoted to national government 
transparency or country-specific transparency, focusing either on the public 
administration or on the private sector. As far as we know, the literature has neglected 
study of the determinants of local government transparency and there are very few 
studies in this research area; a state of affairs noted by Piotrowski and Bertelli (2010).
The contribution of this paper is an empirical assessment of local government 
transparency determinants drawing on the transparency index constructed by the NGO 
Transparency International for the major Spanish municipalities, taking into account the 
role of institutional, economic, and social explanatory factors. Our empirical strategy 
serves to explore and identify how political, economic, and socio-demographic 
conditions affect the transparency of local governments. With this purpose in mind, the 
paper builds on the scarce existing empirical literature on local government 
transparency, which has mainly focused on the area of fiscal and budget transparency. 
Beyond this, the present study takes a broader approach by incorporating into the 
analysis not only other potential determinants of local government transparency, but 
also the evaluation of these models in different areas such as procurement and urban 
planning, corporate transparency or the relationship between the council and the 
citizen.
2. Local government transparency
In order to position the main contributions of this paper, it is necessary first to 
provide a brief review of the existing literature on empirical evaluations of local 
government transparency, giving special attention to those studies devoted to the 
Spanish experience that may be institutionally more closely linked to our empirical 
exercise.
As far as we know, very few studies have examined the determinants of 
transparency at the local level and no well-established theoretical literature has yet 
been consolidated. Among the most interesting empirical papers on transparency, we 
would mention the work by Esteller and Polo-Otero (2008), who constructed a 
database for Catalan municipalities in which fiscal transparency appears to be 
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determined by political competition, the number of inhabitants, and the accumulation of 
debt. The role of the size of the city was confirmed by Styles and Tennyson (2007) in 
their study on the accessibility of financial reporting for US municipalities on the 
Internet.
Similarly, Caamaño et al. (2011) study budget transparency for 33 
municipalities in Galicia (Spain). Their results provide new insights into the role of 
unemployment, which appears to be negatively correlated with budget transparency, 
and on the non-significance of institutional variables such as coalitions in governments. 
However, their results on debt accumulation contrast with the results of Esteller and 
Polo-Otero (2008), finding the opposite relationship.
Moving on to the fiscal transparency of local government, Guillamón, Bastida, 
and Benito (2011) evaluate the importance of political and socio-economic factors and 
shed light on further relationships. For instance, the authors indicate that municipalities 
collecting more taxes and receiving more transfers disclose more financial information. 
Therefore, fiscal imbalances and debt seem to play a significant role in financial 
transparency.
Another recent working paper is that of Piotrowski and Bertelli (2010), who 
measure municipal transparency in New Jersey based on a set of interviews conducted 
according to an item response model. Their paper treats transparency as a broader 
term than simply budget or fiscal transparency. However, while their empirical model 
considers different groups of socio-economic, institutional, and economic determinants, 
it suffers from very limited explanatory power. Among the factors introduced in the 
model we find regressors measuring transparency demand, socio-economic status 
factors related to political engagement, fiscal ratings, and different forms of 
government. Only the population’s level of education, the percentage of elderly 
inhabitants in the population, and the size of the budget appear to be statistically
significant. However, the two latter determinants show counter-intuitive coefficient signs 
that are contrary to expectations.2
Jorge et al. (2011) address fiscal transparency from a comparative international 
perspective, studying the transparency of Portuguese and Italian local governments’ 
website content. Their regression model finds only two statistically significant variables: 
2 The reason for this seems to be linked to the criteria used in the construction of the 
transparency index.
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the size of the municipality – although this confirmation of the relationship between size 
and transparency only holds for Italy – and the rate of abstention in the last local 
elections. The latter variable offers an unexpected and counter-intuitive impact, 
because abstention appears to be a positive determinant of transparency in their 
analysis. 
As a result, this pioneering literature has focused basically on the role of 
political, accounting, and budget determinants on fiscal transparency. Even in the field 
of fiscal transparency, there is still a great deal to do in order to improve our 
understanding of the determinants of local government transparency. And an even 
longer road lies ahead in the case of other transparency categories. In this paper, we 
build upon the literature on fiscal transparency by confirming and rejecting some of the 
previous results across a wide sample of more than 100 Spanish cities. However, we 
take a broader approach to transparency by including other transparency areas beyond 
the fiscal category, such as those related to corporate transparency, social 
transparency in relationships with citizens, services contracting transparency, and 
procurement and urban planning transparency. In addition to some standard 
explanatory factors introduced in the above literature, we introduce variables on the 
economic and institutional context, testing them as determinants of transparency for 
the first time.
3. A Transparency Index for Spanish Local Governments
Spain is one of the few European countries that do not yet have a transparency 
law. In fact, it is the only one if you consider only countries with more than one million 
inhabitants. Under the current Spanish framework, governments are not required to 
provide the public with information on their activities or decision-making procedures. 
This affects every level of government in a decentralized country that has a central 
government, regional governments, and local entities, including counties and 
municipalities at the local level. For this reason, the new Spanish government elected 
in 2012 has decided to introduce a draft law that will be discussed in the national 
parliament in 2012 and is expected to be passed in the second half of the year.
Given this context of voluntary transparency, the NGO Transparency 
International (TI-Spain) has been producing a transparency index for local 
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governments in Spain since 2008.3 This index contains information for the years 2008, 
2009, and 2010 and is based on the collection of information and questionnaires sent 
to municipalities on five different transparency areas: corporate transparency, social 
transparency in relationships with citizens, fiscal transparency, urban planning and 
procurement transparency, and services contracting transparency.  
TI transparency indexes range from 0 to 100, with 100 indicating a perfectly 
transparent government and 0 a government with no transparency at all. The global 
transparency index and each of the five specific indexes are constructed with the 
affirmative and negative responses of municipalities to the 80 items considered and 
with information collected by TI directly from public sources. A summary of these items 
is presented in the appendix of this paper (A1). The number of municipalities contained 
in the 2010 survey is 110. Their names are also displayed in table 1 together with their 
overall transparency score. As can be observed, we find values between 22 and 100, 
giving wide variation to the sample. 
<<Insert table 1 about here>>
Guillamón, Bastida, and Benito (2011), who also used this index in their 
empirical analysis of budget transparency for the year 2008, noted that Spanish laws 
determine the minimum information municipalities must disclose, but that the majority 
of TI-Spain questionnaire items exceed these minimum requirements, thus falling 
within the category of voluntary disclosure. 
Thanks to this index we are able to exploit differences in the institutional, 
political, social, and economic characteristics of cities. This should enable identification 
of the main determinants of overall transparency and all separate transparency 
indexes.
4. Empirical strategy 
The most recent transparency index of Transparency International is the one 
derived from the 2010 survey. The overall index and the indexes for different 
3 Transparency International (TI) is an international organization that is non-governmental, non-
partisan and nonprofit. It is dedicated to fighting corruption at national and 
international levels. Since its founding in 1993, TI has been widely recognized with putting the 
fight against corruption on the global agenda. 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                             Document de Treball   2012/10 pàg. 10
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                             Working Paper          2012/10 pag. 10
10
categories serve as our set of dependent variables. First, we examine the determinants 
of the overall transparency index. Second, we apply the same empirical model in 
explaining the five separate transparency indexes in order to evaluate their different 
drivers.
The empirical model for estimating the factors that explain municipal 
transparency uses the following groups of variables: socio-demographic variables, 
fiscal variables, institutional variables, and economic context variables. The variables 
included in each of these categories are set out below:
Socio-demographic variables
Population: Size of the city in terms of inhabitants (in thousands). This variable tests for 
differences in transparency by size of city. It has usually been included in previous 
works that have found a positive and statistically significant impact (Styles and 
Tennyson 2007; Esteller and Polo-Otero, 2009; Jorge, et al. 2011). The data are 
collected from the Spanish National Statistics Institute.
Gender: % of men over the total local population. Verba, Nie, and Jae-On (1978) find 
that men are more active politically and more politically engaged (Piotrowski and Van 
Ryzin, 2007). The data are collected from the Spanish National Statistics Institute.
Elderly: % of citizens aged 65 years or older over the total local population. It must be 
noted, however, that some papers find that this variable may have an opposite effect 
depending on how transparency is considered. The weight of website information 
within the transparency index may be a source of the inverse effects on the 
relationship between the elderly and transparency. The data are collected from the 
Spanish National Statistics Institute.
Fiscal variables
Debt:  Local government debt as a % of total budget. This is extracted from the Budget 
of Local Governments in Spain, published by the Ministry of Public Finance.
Budget_imbalance: Local government balance. Deficit or surplus as a % of total 
budget. This is extracted from the Budget of Local Governments in Spain, published 
by the Ministry of Public Finance.
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Institutional variables
Left_Mayor: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the ruling local government leader 
belongs to a left-wing party, and 0 otherwise. This variable tests for the role of 
ideology, assuming that left-wing governments might be more sensitive to the 
provision of transparency than right-wing parties. Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) 
show that ideology is a determinant of transparency. The data are collected from the 
Ministry of Home Affairs.
Left_Majority: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the ruling left-wing local 
government leader’s party enjoys a ½+1 majority of representatives in the elected 
council. This variable identifies left-wing governments not needing agreements with 
other parties to govern the city. The data are collected from the Ministry of Home 
Affairs.
Right_Majority: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the ruling right-wing local 
government leader’s party enjoys a ½+1 majority of representatives in the elected 
council. This variable identifies right-wing governments not needing agreements with 
other parties to rule the city. The data are collected from the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Capital: Binary variable taking a value of 1 if the municipality is a provincial capital. 
These capitals have important exceptions or particularities with respect to other cities 
based on the simple fact that they political capitals in Spain.4 Moreover, the public 
administration has a greater presence in these cities than in other cities, because 
state administration and central government delegations have offices in them. Also, 
other administrations such as the provincial authorities or diputaciones, which provide 
additional services to municipalities and citizens, are constituted at the province level 
and are established in provincial capitals.
Turnout: Percentage of participation in the last local elections in the municipality. This 
variable serves as a proxy for citizens’ concern or interest in politics and, therefore, it 
is a proxy for the demand for accountability and transparency. The data are collected 
from the Ministry of Home Affairs.
4 Several rules apply to provincial capitals. For instance, these cities do not need to have 50,000 
inhabitants in order to receive subsidies for transportation services as others cities do, simply by 
virtue of being provincial capitals. 
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Unemployment: Share of unemployed inhabitants in the municipality. The importance 
of this variable is reflected by Caamaño, et al. (2011) in the case of budget 
transparency in the region of Galicia. 
Economic context variables
Economic_Activity: Index of economic activity per capita. Comparative index of 
all economic activity. This index is obtained from the taxes corresponding to the total of 
all economic activity (industry, trade, and services) and professional activity. It draws 
on the municipal database elaborated by the “La Caixa” savings bank.
Tourism: Index of tourist activity per capita. We use the comparative index of tourist 
importance provided by the municipal database elaborated by the “La Caixa” savings 
bank. This index is obtained from the fee or business tax levied on tourist 
activities, which in turn is based on the category of tourist facilities (hotels and 
motels, apartments and B&Bs, inns and guest houses, campsites 
and apartments managed by companies), number of bedrooms, and annual 
occupancy (all year or partial year), so it is virtually an indicator of the level of tourist 
activity. 
The empirical specifications tested for all transparency indexes take the 
following forms:
Specification 1 
Transparency_Indexi = i  1 Populationi  2 Genderi  3 Elderlyi  4 Debti  5
Deficiti  6 Dcapitali 7 DLeft_Majori  8  Turnouti  9 Unemploymenti  10 
Economic_Activityi11Tourismi i
Specification 2 
Transparency_Indexi  i  1 Populationi  2 Genderi + 3 Elderlyi  4 Debti  5
Deficiti 6 Dcapitail7 DLeft_Majorityi 8 DRight_Majorityi 9 Turnouti + 10 Unemploymenti
11 Economic_Activityi12Tourismi i
The first specification uses the political orientation binary variable DLeft_Mayor,
while the second specification takes into account the degree of the majority with which 
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local government leaders rule, considering the political orientation of local government 
leaders with an absolute majority (DLeft_Majority; DRight_Majority) in the council with respect to 
local government leaders without such a majority.
First, these models will be estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
Given the presence of heteroskedasticity we apply the White robust correction of 
errors. We also take into account the possible correlation between municipalities of the 
same region by including clusters at regional level.5 Second, we estimate a censored 
regression model given that transparency indexes are right-censored at 100 points, 
although only five municipalities achieve this value. Descriptive statistics are displayed 
in table 2.
<<Insert table 2 about here>>
5. Results
Table 3 displays our main results for the overall transparency index, while table 
4 presents estimates for each of the transparency categories.6
<<Insert table 3 about here>>
Regarding socio-demographic covariates, we found that only population is 
statistically significant and has the expected sign. Therefore, we confirm that larger 
municipalities tend to enjoy better transparency than smaller municipalities. Moreover, 
this is consistent across all types of transparency except in the case of service 
contracting. The remaining socio-demographic variables are not statistically significant 
in any of our models.
Fiscal variables are not relevant in the determination of the overall transparency 
index. In fact, our results on the non-significant role of debt level are consistent with 
results obtained by Alt and Lassen (2006) on fiscal transparency. However, we find an 
interesting result in the specific contracting category in the case of budget imbalance. 
As shown in table 4, budget surplus is positively associated with contracting 
5 We use the cluster-robust variance correction included in the statistical package STATA. This 
is known as the Huber/White/sandwich estimate of variance (See Williams, 2000).
6 Multicollinearity is discarded given the low variance inflation factor value obtained: VIF = 1.20. 
The model has no omitted variables (Prob > F = 0.8409). 
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transparency. In other words, there is an interesting negative correlation between 
deficits and contracting transparency. 
<<Insert table 4 about here>>
Institutional variables provide the most interesting results. A local government 
leader’s ideology or political party does influence the local government transparency 
index. According to our results, left-wing local government leaders are positively 
correlated with the overall transparency index and with most of the transparency 
categories. Political orientation has the greatest impact on the category of fiscal 
transparency. This result confirms the view of Ferejohn (1999), who argued that left-
wing governments, wanting a larger public sector, are expected to implement higher 
levels of transparency. Therefore, these results are consistent with Guillamón, Bastida, 
and Benito (2011) as well. The smallest impact is found in the case of corporate 
transparency, which does not present any difference between right-wing and left-wing 
local government leaders in terms of statistical significance, although the coefficient 
presents a difference of four percentage points.
Beyond the difference by ideology, it is interesting to evaluate the role of local 
government leaders with an absolute majority compared to local government leaders 
without an absolute majority in the council, and break down the comparison by political 
party. Column 2 in table 3 shows that when a local government leader enjoys an 
absolute majority (more than 50% of elected councilors), his or her municipality gets 
worse results in transparency indexes, regardless of ideology, according to the OLS 
regression model. In the case of the censored regression model, we find that this is 
only true for right-wing local government leaders (column 4, table 3). That said, right-
wing local government leaders with an absolute majority always present larger negative 
coefficients than left-wing local government leaders. In fact, according to the OLS 
estimates, while cities with right-wing local government leaders enjoy around four 
percentage points less of transparency, when these local government leaders enjoy an 
absolute majority the negative percentage points increase to about nine with respect to 
municipalities without an absolute majority of any political orientation.
Another interesting result is the relationship between provincial capitals and 
transparency in Spain. Their associated coefficient is one of the largest and shows 
significance levels among the greatest across all models. Being a political capital of a 
Spanish province is largely associated with lower transparency indexes in all aspects 
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or categories of transparency. Provincial capitals are the last arms of central 
government power in the territory and enjoy a larger presence of public administrations. 
As a consequence, economic resources and political power are significantly higher in 
this type of municipality, regardless of size or local economic context. Our results 
indicate that this particularity impedes the extent of transparency.
According to our OLS estimates, provincial capitals have lower transparency by 
15 percentage points than the remaining municipalities. Interestingly, this coefficient 
increases to 28 in the case of fiscal transparency, resulting in the worst record of 
transparency found in our estimates. The presence of more public administrations and 
the fact of being the last arm of the central government administration in the territory 
seem to pose an obstacle to transparency in these cities.
As the last institutional variable in our estimates, turnouts do not appear to be 
statistically significant, contrary to what happens in other studies previously cited on 
fiscal transparency.
Regarding economic context variables, we found that only the coefficient related 
to how important tourist activity is in municipalities is statistically significant and 
presents a negative sign. Nonetheless, we must point out that the size of the coefficient 
is very small for the overall transparency index and for each of the categories tested.
6. Conclusions
While the literature on the determinants of government transparency is evolving, 
it is still in its early stages. This is even more marked in the case of local government 
transparency if we take into account the scarce knowledge available and the small 
number of papers that address this topic. For this reason, there is a great deal to learn 
from the first efforts devoted by researchers to an issue of increasing importance in 
societies demanding higher accountability and transparency in the management of 
public administrations.
Our results for Spanish local governments indicate that the drivers of 
transparency are: the size of a municipality (population); whether tourist activity is a 
leading economic and social factor in a municipality; the institutional characteristics of 
the local government, as the leader’s ideology and its majority; and whether a 
municipality is a provincial capital. The latter two institutional particularities are, 
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according to the magnitude of their coefficients, the most important drivers of 
transparency. These results are consistent across most categories of transparency, 
indicating that more effort should be devoted to improving transparency in provincial 
capitals and cities where local government leaders enjoy an absolute majority, 
especially when they belong to a right-wing party. 
The use of several categories, beyond the standard focus on fiscal 
transparency in the early literature, serves to identify a number of relationships 
neglected in the case of overall transparency models, justifying such efforts in the aim 
of devising transparency indexes for different segments or government activities. For
instance, we find that budget imbalances are important in the determination of 
contracting transparency and that unemployment and the percentage of the elderly are 
relevant in the case of fiscal transparency. 
Although these models and results provide interesting insights into the 
determinants of local government transparency, it is obvious that there is still a great 
deal of work to do in order to improve our understanding of the motivations and 
obstacles related to transparency at this level of government. Meanwhile, our results 
indicate some areas of concern that should receive in-depth analysis in future 
research.
As a final remark, it is necessary to acknowledge that although the literature has 
shown that transparency is correlated with corruption, we must be cautious about the 
interpretation of our results and avoid drawing a causal link between low rates of 
transparency and corruption. That said, our results do point to the main determinants of 
local government transparency in Spain, and we examine several areas in order to 
enrich the existing knowledge of transparency.
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TABLES






BILBAO 100 EL EJIDO 70
GIJÓN 100 LOGROÑO 70
PONFERRADA 100 SEGOVIA 70
PUERTO DE SANTA MARÍA 100 CUENCA 69
SABADELL 100 FERROL 68
SANT CUGAT DEL VALLÉS 100
SAN SEBASTIÁN DE 
LOS REYES 68




AVILÉS 96 MURCIA 66
ELCHE 96 PAMPLONA 66
GANDÍA 95 ZARAGOZA 66
MÁLAGA 95 SAGUNTO 65
GETXO 93 TOLEDO 65
JAÉN 93 VALLADOLID 65




TERRASSA 91 TARRAGONA 64
PALENCIA 90 MAJADAHONDA 63
REUS 90 ALGECIRAS 61
BARCELONA 89 BADALONA 61
OVIEDO 89 LAS ROZAS 61
ALCORCÓN 88 ALICANTE 58
LUGO 88 PONTEVEDRA 58
ROQUETAS DE MAR 88 LORCA 56
RUBÍ 88 OURENSE 56
VITORIA 88 GRANADA 55
JEREZ DE LA FRONTERA 86 MARBELLA 55
SANTIAGO DE 
COMPOSTELA 86 TORREJÓN DE ARDOZ 55
BARAKALDO 85 HUESCA 54
CARTAGENA 85 POZUELO DE ALARCÓN 54
MANRESA 85 ÁVILA 53
SANTA COLOMA DE 
GRAMENET 85 CIUDAD REAL 53
LÉRIDA 84 ZAMORA 53




A CORUÑA 83 CÁDIZ 48
ALBACETE 83 ALCALÁ DE HENARES 45
GETAFE 83 BURGOS 41
SEVILLA 83 TALAVERA DE LA REINA 41
TORRENT 81 HUELVA 40
CASTELLÓN DE LA PLANA 80 LEÓN 39
LEGANÉS 80 VALENCIA 39
PARLA 79 SAN FERNANDO 38
COSLADA 78 ALCALÁ DE GUADAÍRA 36
MÓSTOLES 78 BADAJOZ 36
FUENLABRADA 76
CHICLANA DE LA 
FRONTERA 36
TORREVIEJA 76 CÁCERES 35
GUADALAJARA 75 TERUEL 33
CÓRDOBA 74 ALMERÍA 29
GIRONA 74 SALAMANCA 29
SANTANDER 74 FUENGIROLA 23
VÉLEZ-MÁLAGA 74
MIJAS 71 Mean 70
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of covariates
Regressors Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Socio-demographic 
variables






Debt 5.23 2.73 0 19
Budget_Surplus 4.74 23.50 -59 99
Institutional and political 
variables
Capital 0.44 0.49 0 1
Left_Mayor 0.52 0.50 0 1
Left_Majority 0.13 0.34 0 1
Right_Majority 0.36 0.48 0 1
Turnout 61.90 7.14 46 75
Economic context variables
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N. Observations 103 103 103 103
R2 0.23 0.23 - -
F-Test (Joint Significance) 108.27*** 273.28*** - -
Log-Likelihood - - -428.59 -428.46
Wald Chi2 - - 25.79*** 26.05**
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted 
for correlation between municipalities of the same region). 
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N. Observations 103 103 103 103 103
R2 0.29 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.16
F-Test (Joint 
Significance) 68.37*** 41.85*** 546.91***
19.07*** 13.28***
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted for correlation between 
municipalities of the same region).
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APPENDIX
A1. International Transparency (TI) Local Index composition
CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY (19 items)
- Basic information on elected officials and public servants (7 items)
- Information on a council’s internal organization (6 items)
- Information on municipal rules, norms and regulatory measures (6 items) 
SOCIAL TRANSPARENCY (18 items)
- Characteristics of a council’s webpage (2 items)
- Information and citizen services (10 items)
- Commitment to citizens (6 items)
FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY (19 items)
- Accounting and budget information (9 items)
- Information on revenues and expenditures (6 items)
- Information on debt (4 items)
SERVICES CONTRACTING TRANSPARENCY (7 items)
- Information on services contracting procedures (4 items)
- Relationships and operations with contracted providers (3 items)
URBAN PLANNING AND PROCUREMENT TRANSPARENCY (17 items)
- Urban planning information (4 items)
- Decisions on urban rezoning and awards (2 items)
- Ads and procurement (3 items)
- Information on auctions and bidders: offers and resolutions (2 items)
- Works tracking and control (3 items)
- Indicators on public procurement and urban planning (3 items)
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